A number of researchers have recently argued that politeness is not always inferred in the form of an implicature as claimed by Brown and Levinson (1987) , but rather can be anticipated by addressees when it involves expected behaviour.
A number of researchers, however, have argued that this assumption is counter-intuitive. They argue that politeness is generally not inferred as an implicature, as it is usually expected by interactants, and thus is not noticed (Escandell-Vidal, 1998; Jary, 1998a; Fraser, 1990 Fraser, , 1999 Matsui, 2001; Terkourafi, 2001a Terkourafi, , 2001b Zegarac, 1998) . This kind of politeness is termed "anticipated politeness" by Fraser (1999) , in order to contrast it with Brown and Levinson's view of politeness as inferred. While a number of researchers argue that politeness is only anticipated and thus is never inferred (Escandell-Vidal, 1998; Fraser, 1999) , 1 others have assumed that although politeness is primarily anticipated, it may also be inferred in the form of an implicature (Jary, 1998a: 6-7; Matsui 2001: 52; Terkourafi, 2001a Terkourafi, : 179, 2001b Zegarac 1998: 353-354) . In other words, there are two main ways in which politeness is communicated: it may be anticipated or it may be inferred.
In this paper, the way in which politeness arises relative to situation-specific social norms is first discussed to illustrate how the expectations that underlie anticipated and inferred politeness are distinct from adherence to social norms or conventions. The distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness is then considered in more detail in the second section, contrasting it with other distinctions that have been drawn in politeness theory. In the third section, it is briefly argued that relevance theoretic explanations of politeness do not provide a solid basis for furthering our understanding of the notions of anticipated and inferred politeness. In the final section it is suggested that discourse politeness theory (Usami 1998 (Usami , 2001a (Usami , 2001b (Usami , 2002 , has greater potential for future investigation of this important distinction in politeness theory.
Politeness and social norms 2
Politeness involves people showing they think well of others or showing they don't think more highly of themselves than they should. In Japanese, for example, this may involve showing one respects the social position of others (or that one does not respect one's own social position too much). In English, on the other hand, it may involve showing one respects the right of others to be free from imposition (or that one does not think too highly of one's own right to be free from imposition). What constitutes showing one thinks well of others (or at least showing one does not think badly of others), and showing one does not think more highly of oneself than one should, involves a number of aspects that vary across different cultures. In other words, politeness is a culture-sensitive phenomenon (Alymursy and Wilson, 2001; Janney and Arndt, 1993; Lee-Wong, 2002; Nwoye, 1989) .
On the basis of utterances which show a speaker thinks well of others (or at least not badly of others), addressee's form perceptions of how others evaluate them.
And addressee's also form perceptions of how others evaluate themselves, on the basis of utterances which show a speaker does not think more highly of him/herself than he should. When the addressee's perceptions lie within the thresholds of appropriateness as dictated by social norms (Eelen, 2001; Selnick, 2002) , various types of politeness arise. These social norms vary according to the situation and also across individuals. In other words, politeness is situation-sensitive (Matsumoto, 1989; Pan, 2000) , and perceptions of it vary across native speakers of a language (Eelen, 2001 In other words, expectations as estimations of the probability that a particular behaviour will occur. It is expectation in this second sense that is fundamental to the way in which politeness is communicated: whether it is anticipated or it is inferred.
The distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness
The distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness is predicated on the notion of expectation as an estimation of the probability that a certain behaviour will occur. In other words, what the addressee thinks the speaker will most likely show the speaker thinks of the addressee (or what the addressee thinks the speaker will most likely show the speakers thinks of the speaker). If we expect a certain behaviour to occur that does indeed occur, and this behaviour gives rise to politeness, then politeness is anticipated. On the other hand, if we are not expecting a certain behaviour to occur that nevertheless does occur, and this behaviour gives rise to politeness, then this politeness must be inferred. In other words, politeness is anticipated when the behaviour giving rise to politeness is expected, while it is inferred when the behaviour giving rise to politeness is not expected.
Politeness which is anticipated arises, and thus is unnoticed, when the linguistic form or pragmatic strategy is conventionally used in a particular situation (Terkourafi 2001a (Terkourafi : 179, 2001b Zegarac 1998: 353) . In other words, we expect that someone will show they think well of others, or do not think more highly of themselves than they should (thereby giving rise to politeness), because this particular linguistic form or strategy is commonly used in that kind of situation.
In example (1), the utterance is conventionalised in (British) English for conveying a request such as (2).
(1) (John is a guest addressing his host at during a dinner party at the latter's house) John: I was wondering if it is OK to open some windows?
(2) The speaker wants some windows opened. (Terkourafi 2001a: 179) Terkourafi claims that politeness is a part of the conventional meaning of the utterance in (1) in this context.
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"Based on his/her prior experience in similar communicative situations, s/he will already hold a belief that, roughly, 'uttering (something like) (1) when one is a guest at another's house and one wishes to perform 'something like) the request in (2) in English is polite'. Based on this belief, upon the speaker's uttering (1) in this situation, the addressee will form the further belief that the speaker is polite. Since politeness as a perlocutionary effect consists in the addressee holding this further belief, politeness will now have been achieved without the recognition of whatever intention the speaker may have had. That is, it will have now been not implicated, but anticipated: requiring no inferencing to be achieved, it passes unnoticed." (ibid: 180).
In another example of anticipated politeness, when meeting colleagues at the department in which I work it is normal to greet each other in a formulaic sequence such as illustrated in example (3).
(3) Jane: Hi, how are you?
Bill: I'm fine, how are you?
Jane: Good thanks.
Since the main function of Jane's first utterance is not really to inquire about the hearer's well-being as such, but rather to simply show the willingness of Jane to engage in social interaction with Bill, it is an example of phatic communication, which also gives rise to politeness. 4 The politeness arising from this utterance, however, is generally not noticed. In fact, it is only noticed in its absence, because Bill expects that Jane will say something like this. That is to say, if Jane does not say Hi, how are you? when bumping into Bill, although it might simply be interpreted as tiredness on Jane's part, it could also be interpreted as a lack of concern for him, which could give rise to perceptions of impoliteness. The politeness that arises in this kind of example is thus anticipated, because Bill expects Jane will show she is willing to engage in social interaction with him by saying something like Hi, how are you?
Politeness is inferred (by means of an implicature) "when the expression used by the speaker is not conventionalised for some use" (ibid: 175). Terkourafi (2001a) argues that in (British) English the utterance in example (4) gives rise to the implicature that the speaker is being polite in the process of drawing the (particularised) implicature that the speaker wants the hearer to make it 'not-hot'
for the speaker.
(4) (A is a guest addressing his host during a dinner party at the latter's house)
A: It's hot in here.
Implies: The speaker is being polite [in uttering (4)] Implies: The speaker wants me to somehow make it 'not-hot' for him/her.
(ibid: 177)
In this example, politeness is not anticipated, because the hearer does not necessarily expect that speaker will show he thinks well of him or her by implying a request in this manner, so it must therefore be inferred.
Examples of inferred politeness can also be found in Japanese. In example (5) the speaker's intention to be polite is inferred directly from what the teacher says.
(5) (A teacher says to a student…) (Matsui, 2001: 54) The meaning of the first clause of the teacher's utterance (kono eibun essei, naiyoo totemo ii) directly expresses approval or encouragement of the hearer (that is, the teacher shows he or she thinks well of the student). The fact that the teacher shows she thinks well of her student is inferred by the student rather than being anticipated, because this kind of utterance is not conventionally used to show approval of someone (thereby giving rise to politeness).
In further example in Japanese, Mari indirectly refuses Yoko's invitation to go to karaoke by giving a reason why she can't go, thereby implicating politeness. There are a number of other distinctions that have been previously drawn in politeness theory that might appear to be related to the distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness. In particular, Watts' (1989 Watts' ( , 1992 notion of "politic behaviour" which encompasses polite behaviour, Ide's (1989) notions of "discernment politeness" and "volitional politeness", and Lee-Wong's (2000) notions of "normative politeness" and "strategic politeness". However, the focus of these concepts differs from that highlighted in the distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness.
Watts ' (1989, 1992) suggests that politeness should be viewed in the wider context of "politic behaviour". The former is defined as marked behaviour that leads to an enhancement of one's standing with respect to others (that is, making other people have a better opinion of oneself) (Watts, 1992: 51) Politeness is either anticipated or it is inferred, while in Watts' view politeness is one species of politic behaviour, or at least overlaps with it.
The notions of discernment and volitional politeness (Ide, 1989) The distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness constitutes an important part of the relevance theoretic approach to politeness. Relevance theorists have argued that the 'principle of relevance' can be used to make this distinction. In the following section it is argued, however, that the notion of cognitive effects, which is central to the principle of relevance, needs to be more adequately characterised in relation to politeness if it is to provide a solid theoretical foundation for further developments of this important distinction.
Relevance theory and anticipated versus inferred politeness
Relevance theory is essentially a theory of utterance comprehension from the perspective of the hearer. Its core claim is that all communication is constrained by the 'principle of relevance'. The principle of relevance, or more specifically the communicative principle of relevance, states that "every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance" (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 260) , where relevance is defined as a balance between (positive) cognitive effects and processing effort (pp.265-266).
Relevance theory has been criticised as an inherently asocial pragmatic theory (Mey and Talbot 1988) , but others have countered that relevance theory can accommodate social aspects of communication (Jucker 1988; Coupland and Jaworski 1997; Sperber and Wilson 1997) . A number of studies have attempted to apply relevance theory to the study of politeness (Escandell-Vidal 1996 Jary 1998a Jary , 1998b Matsui 2001; Zegarac, 1998 Zegarac, , 2000 , retaining Brown and
Levinson's notion of 'face' as part of their explanations of politeness phenomena.
As was noted previously, a number of relevance theorists have argued that generally politeness is not intended to be communicated by interlocutors (that is, it is not inferred as Brown and Levinson claim), but rather is a matter of 'social adequacy' or conforming to a set of cultural norms (Escandell-Vidal 1996 Jary 1998a; Zegarac 1998 Under this view, politeness is not inferred, because it arises from following social norms; and nothing is inferred through the adherence to these social norms, if the interlocutors involved usually follow these social norms (just as nothing in particular is inferred from producing grammatical utterances in most situations).
In other words, the interpersonal cognitive effects arising from this kind of utterance are not sufficiently great to outweigh the processing costs involved, so they are not relevant enough to be inferred.
The relevance theoretic approach to politeness has been applied in examining honorifics and other related politeness phenomena in Japanese. Honorifics (sonkeigo and kenjoogo; 'subject' and 'object' honorifics), speech levels (keitai and jootai; 'polite forms' and 'non-polite forms'), and personal pronouns, which are often used according to social norms, are termed 'politeness indicators' by Matsui In drawing the distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness, relevance theorists claim that politeness can only be inferred when the assumption of politeness is 'relevant' enough. Whether an assumption is 'relevant' enough to be inferred depends on whether or not it has sufficiently large cognitive effects relative to processing effort. However, the problem facing the relevance theoretic account of the distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness is that neither cognitive effects nor processing effort (the two key components of The notion of cognitive effects which underlies the principle of relevance has not been sufficiently characterised in relation to politeness. It is thus difficult to see how the principle of relevance can be useful in furthering our understanding of the distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness. While relevance theorists have tried to refute the claim that relevance theory is essentially asocial, to date it has not provided a solid foundation upon which to theorize about social phenomena such as politeness.
However, there are alternative frameworks in which to examine the distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness. In the following section, the potential of discourse politeness theory for further investigation of this distinction is discussed.
Discourse politeness theory and anticipated versus inferred politeness
The importance of examining politeness not only at the utterance level, but also at the discourse level, has been emphasised by Usami, who is developing a discourse theory of politeness (1998, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) . The two key proposals in discourse politeness theory are the interdependent notions of "discourse politeness" and "unmarked politeness".
The notion of discourse politeness is an attempt by Usami to integrate discourse level phenomena into politeness theory. Discourse politeness is defined by Usami (2001a) as follows:
"Discourse politeness is the functional dynamic as a whole of factors (including factors at the level of utterances) giving rise to 'pragmatic politeness', which cannot be observed at the level of single utterances, but rather only in longer stretches of discourse." (p.11) 7 In other words, discourse politeness is the "contribution of the discourse as a whole towards the regulation of politeness" (ibid: 9).
Usami goes on to suggest that discourse politeness is primarily realized as "unmarked politeness" in conversations. Unmarked politeness is essentially synonymous with the notion of anticipated politeness. Unmarked politeness is defined as follows:
"It is a type (of politeness) where certain language behaviour is unconsciously expected, and when it does not occur as expected and one becomes conscious of this, the utterance or discourse is taken to be impolite. In other words, it refers to neither particularly (marked) polite utterances, nor to impolite utterances, but rather refers to the state of the discourse as a whole. I term utterances contributing to the discourse as a whole which are not impolite and satisfy what is implicitly expected to occur according to each specific situation, 'unmarked behaviour'. 'Unmarked behaviour' becomes 'unmarked politeness' when politeness is involved." (ibid: 12)
For discourse politeness in each specific context there are 'defaults', both for discourse politeness as a whole, and for the individual factors which constitute discourse politeness, and these represent unmarked politeness in that conversation.
On the other hand, linguistic behaviour which deviates from these defaults and shows concern for the interlocutor is termed "marked politeness". Marked politeness is equated with Brown and Levinson's implicated politeness by Usami (ibid: 11). Usami (2001a, b) discusses the use of 'speech levels' in Japanese to illustrate the contrast between unmarked and marked politeness. 8 She claims that the unmarked speech level for utterance-endings in conversations between people meeting for the first time is the 'polite form' (P), while the unmarked speech level for conversations between friends or housewives is the 'non-polite form' (N).
The 'polite form' (keitai) is essentially the desu/masu form (e.g. ikimasu, 'to go'), while the 'non-polite form' (jootai) is the plain or dictionary form (e.g. iku, 'to go').
These respective forms are unmarked when they are used more than 50% of the time in conversations, and constitute the unmarked discourse politeness defaults in their respective contexts. Thus in conversations between people meeting for the first time, the 'non-polite form' constitutes marked behaviour, while in conversations between housewives or friends, the 'polite form' represents marked behaviour.
There are three types of effects marked behaviour can give rise to:
(1) "marked politeness" (for example, the use of 'non-polite forms' in conversations between people meeting for the first time may show familiarity or closeness (that is, show the speaker approves of the addressee), while the use of 'polite forms' in conversations between friends may show the speaker's reluctance to impinge on the hearer (that is, show the speaker respects the addressee).
(2) "linguistic discourse effects" (for example, emphasising propositional content or topic changes).
(3) "minus politeness" (that is, impoliteness or sarcasm).
In order to identify marked politeness (and other effects such as impoliteness), it is therefore necessary to first establish what constitutes unmarked politeness in a particular conversation (Usami 2001a: 45) .
Usami (2002) reports from her analysis of 72 conversations between unacquainted Japanese adults, that 60% of utterance-endings were the 'polite form', 10% were the 'non-polite form', and 30% had no 'politeness marker' at all. The default ratio for speech levels in this context is therefore: 'polite form' 6: 'non-polite form' 1: no marker 3. The default speech level for conversations between unacquainted adults can thus be identified as the 'polite form'. In other words, the polite form constitutes 'unmarked politeness' in this context, and thus 'non-polite forms', in particular, are a form of marked behaviour (Usami 2001a: 32-33 Japanese by Kim (2000) , who examined twelve conversations (six for each language) between unacquainted people in their twenties. Kim found that 30%
of utterances contained 'super-polite forms' (that is, subject and object honorifics)
in Korean, while only 10% of utterances contained 'super-polite forms' in Japanese. Thus politeness (or some other kind of effect) may be inferred in
Korean if more than 30% of utterances in a conversation contain super-polite forms, while in Japanese conversations politeness may be inferred if only more than 10% of utterances contain super-polite forms.
Another example of discourse politeness defaults is that found by Xie (2001) in her study of utterance sequence patterns of requests in Chinese and Japanese.
Her analysis of 120 conversations (60 for each language), which all involved a request to borrow some notes and handouts from a previous class at university from a close friend, showed a clear difference in the discourse politeness defaults for request utterance sequences. In Japanese, the discourse politeness default sequence was found to be an attention-getter (such as 'excuse me' or calling out the addressee's name), followed by checking potential for compliance, and then supportive moves (such as giving reasons for the request), before the request utterance itself. In Chinese, however, the discourse politeness default sequence was found to involve only an attention-getter followed by the request utterance.
Thus in Chinese, the use of supportive moves in making a request would constitute marked behaviour in this context. Although it could be interpreted as a form of marked politeness (that is, showing one respects the addressee), it is more likely to be interpreted as expressing social distance and unfriendliness (ibid: 98).
Conclusion
The notion of anticipated politeness is firmly grounded in our expectations about how people will interact with others. Politeness is anticipated when we think someone will say or do something that shows they think well of us (or do not think more highly of themselves than they should), and that person does as we expect. In contrast, politeness is inferred when we do not think someone will say or do something that shows they think well of us (or do not think more highly of themselves than they should), yet that person still does it contrary to our expectations. Whether anticipated politeness should be regarded as more important or prevalent than inferred politeness is still to be resolved, but whatever the result of that debate, it is clear that the existence of this distinction counters
Brown and Levinson's claim that politeness is always inferred as an implicature.
Relevance theorists have been instrumental in bringing the notion of anticipated politeness to the fore. However, relevance theory does not provide a solid foundation upon which to investigate this distinction, because cognitive effects (which are a key component of the notion of relevance) are not sufficiently characterised in relation to politeness.
Discourse politeness theory, on the other hand, constitutes a more useful basis for investigating the distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness. It shows that one way in which to investigate this distinction is to determine the defaults for different elements of conversation (such as speech levels or utterance sequence patterns), through careful analysis of the use of these elements in particular contexts across samples of speech by speakers of the language in question.
While our intuitions provide a starting point for the investigation of the expectations underlying anticipated and inferred politeness, careful analysis of the behaviour of a reasonable sample of speakers is also required to determine what behaviour we might expect in different situations. Empirical analysis to determine defaults also avoids the possibility of unwarranted distortion arising from the researcher's own individual perceptions and intuitions about these defaults. There thus remains much work yet to be done in the field of politeness research.
